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TERMINATOR 2
ROBERT F. NAGEL*

In the movie Terminator 2 there is a figure--I am told it is called
a cyborg--that ostensibly looks like a person but has a frightful, supernatural capacity to re-form itself after it is destroyed. When the
cyborg is shot or axed or crushed (or whatever), its horribly damaged
body seems to' melt or blend and then to re-shape itself until once
again it appears to be an unharmed and powerful human.
Conventional constitutional interpretation is what makes me
think of cyborgs. Consider this Conference. We are here after many
decades of potent and apparently damaging criticisms of normal
Early in the century a clubbing was
interpretive methods.
administered by the progressive realists. More recently an array of
critics--from Bickel to Tushnet, from Bork to Ely, from Dworkin to
Schlag, from Rosenberg to MacKinnon--have hacked away at the
various limbs that support the enterprise. Text, tradition, authorial
intent, structure, moral philosophy, democratic theory, neutrality,
legal convention, practical effect--they all have been ripped,
pummeled, and punctured.
Nevertheless, here in front of us we can see the thing is back, reappearing out of its own dissolution. All four of the main papers
presented at this Conference argue from highly conventional
assumptions about text, history, and judicial role to conclude that the
courts should enforce the Guarantee Clause. And, of course, it is not
only in these proceedings. Think back to Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
confirmation hearings or look at any issue of the Harvard Law
Review. Conventional constitutional interpretation is back. Or,
more precisely, it was never gone.
The reason, of course, is that in general Americans are
committed to judicial review; certainly most lawyers are, and even
most of those legal scholars who have questioned interpretive
methodologies end up supporting the practice. 1 We simply want
judges to solve modern problems by "interpreting" the Constitution.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
" 1. Mark Tushnet, for whom critique used to be all there was, can now sound much
like the conventionalist, Ahkil Amar. See Mark Tushnet, Cohstitutional Cultures, 24
LAw & SocY' REv. 199, 209 (1990) (describing Texas v. Johnson as "simple and
straightforward").
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Whether or not this is actually possible or theoretically justifiable,
we insist on it.
As I said, when a cyborg keeps coming after a mortal wound, it
does so by a spooky process of transformation. Its body is at first
grotesquely elastic but then increasingly substantial and eventually
physical and familiar. The cyborg called constitutional interpretation depends upon a transformation, too. Part of what must be reshaped in order to sustain judicial power is our understanding of the
Constitution. Professor Merritt's admirably clear and careful paper
provides a good illustration.
If judicial enforcement is to be significant, what must the
Constitution be made to look like?. It must, obviously, be made
capable of producing specific and authoritative answers to a set of
modern day problems. If the document is silent, ambiguous, vague,
or contradictory with respect to such a problem, the judge cannot
claim (in the phrase popularized by nominee Ginsburg) to have
gotten "it right." The Constitution must be simplified until it yields
definite answers.
Professor Merritt considers the protection of state authority as a
significant modern problem (as do I). She argues that the text of the
Guarantee Clause, as well as its history, is sufficiently specific to
help resolve aspects of that problem. To accomplish this, she has to
submerge or de-emphasize significant historical evidence, including,
for instance, indications that the Clause was mainly intended to
prevent monarchical governments. She must attribute to words
rather special and somewhat strained meanings.
Notice, for
example, how in her analysis the word "republican" is by degrees
replaced by the phrase "state sovereignty," which connotes not only
popular accountability but also governmental dignity and status.
Similarly, the guarantor in the Clause is "the United States," but
under her proposal the guarantors are the federal judiciary and, I
presume, state judges. 2 Finally, as I will illustrate in a moment, she
has to assume that competing provisions in the document are all
cohesive (or at least irrelevant), so that they can be read as
supportive of her interpretation of the Guarantee Clause. All this, of
course, runs in the face of the likely possibility that the Constitution,
which was drafted and ratified by many people for many reasons
2. A similar disregard for language allows the courts to have a role in regulating

commerce among the states and to enforce rights reserved to the states and to the
people.
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over considerable time, expresses indecisive compromises, convenient
platitudes, context-bound rules largely irrelevant to modem life, and
ideas that are too complex or inconsistent to be very useful in
resolving particular disputes.
The requirement that the judge be able to "get it right" helps to
explain what at first is a slightly surprising aspect of Professor
Merritt's argument. Why does she insist that the Guarantee Clause
is specific on the issue of state sovereignty but that the Tenth
Amendment is a useless "truism"? After all, historical evidence can
be used to flesh out the latter as well as the former. Even the spare
text of the Tenth Amendment, reserving undelegated powers to the
states and the people, can support certain inferences--for example,
that the states were intended at least to have some kind of
governmental status. Investigating why the framers wanted states
to exercise these governmental functions will yield inferences about
state sovereignty not altogether different from those Professor
Merritt finds in the Guarantee Clause. 3 But she rejects this opportunity. Her assumption, I think, is that there is one correct place to
find the answer to the problem of state sovereignty. To acknowledge
that two or more provisions bear on the issue--but only
imperfectly--would be to grant the Constitution the inexactness that
goes with redundancy. It would be to reduce the. likelihood of
authoritative discovery. The solution is there, if only the judge will
4
look in the right place.
It is not enough, of course, that the Constitution be simplified or
stretched or compacted until it enables judges to "get it right." The
answer must not only be correct but also significant under modem
conditions. Consider an example from a different area. To interpret
the First Amendment as prohibiting a national church would probably be correct but would not in itself provide much opportunity for
important judicial activity. Similarly, to interpret the Guarantee
Clause as prohibiting the elimination of the institutions of popular
accountability at the state level might well be correct. But, except
under conditions of a civil war, no act of the national government is
likely to accomplish such wholesale displacement. Additional meaning, therefore, must be attributed to the clause, as Professor Merritt
3. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987).
4. The same impulse lends to urgent arguments about whether rights are located
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, or the
Ninth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth.
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does, for example, when she deduces from the principle of popular
sovereignty the conclusion that the national government may not
compel states to enact or administer particular laws. Personally I
approve of this rule, too, but I have to admit I do not see how a
generally functioning state government becomes unrepublican when
it is coerced by the broader government of which it is a part to enact
a single law. In fact, Professor Merritt acknowledges that a state
government would continue to be republican even if there were many
such coercions, as long as the national government was operating
under proper authorization, such as the Equal Protection Clause or
the Commerce Clause. The effect on the principle of republicanism is
not less because the national law fits into one of those categories.
(Ask the people of Kansas City, where the power of taxation was
largely assumed by a federal judge enforcing a school desegregation
decree. 5 ) Conversely, a law under the commerce power that is
aimed only at state governments, such as the one struck down in
New York v. United States,6 is still only a single law and leaves the
apparatus of accountable government generally intact.
If judges are to have the role we want them to have, then, the
Constitution must be shaped so that it can provide correct answers
applicable to specific disputes that are likely under modern conditions. In addition, the answers must be of a sort that judges can be
expected to find. Some may think that judges are not especially likely
to discover the principle that Professor Merritt proposes. Historically they have shown little interest in the Guarantee Clause;
moreover, since 1937 the Supreme Court has enforced the idea of
state sovereignty (based on a different clause) only twice, and in one
of those cases Professor Merritt thinks they got it wrong. So she,
like most good constitutional scholars, contorts her interpretation so
that traces of it can be found somewhere, if only in latent form, in
the Court's precedents. Her conception of governmental structure,
for example, is strained; she says that the sovereign authority of
states to "determine their own ... structure" includes the power to
locate a state capital, presumably because that decision--which is
geographic, not organizational--is one of the Court's few concessions
to state sovereignty. Similarly, her notion of "compulsion" is

5. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
6. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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questionable. 7
Professor Merritt adopts the Supreme Court's
characterization that the state of New York was "compelled" to enact
a law regulating radioactive waste even when New York had agreed
voluntarily to the interstate compact that required the law. 8
Finally, if judges are to have the role we want for them, the
Constitution must provide meaning that is susceptible to judicial
enforcement. Thus Professor Merritt interprets the word "guarantee" not-only as authorizing, but also as constraining, national power.
Given the practicalities of adjudication, limitations are more easily
enforced by judges than are affirmative obligations. (Even better,
structural principles can be converted to individual rights, as
Professor Chemerinsky suggests.) 9 To the considerable extent that
historical evidence indicates that the intent behind the Guarantee
Clause was mainly to authorize the national government to protect
states against illegitimate insurrections and monarchical movements, the relevant judgments are largely political and the required
actions are essentially military. Therefore, Professor Merritt must
supplant or downplay such evidence.
In conclusion, I should admit that the cyborg created by
Professor Merritt is not very frightening for me. It is similar to some
that I have created myself. In any event, she is certainly not the
worst offender. Her molding of the Constitution distorts but is not
grotesque; it remains true to the idea that the people have some
right to govern their affairs at the state level. In contrast, by the
time that Judge Linde and Professors Abrams and Chemerinsky--and innumerable others waiting in the wings--get through,
autocratic judges will be engaged, even more than they are already,
in displacing the right of the people to govern themselves. They will
do this, looking at you earnestly right in the eye, in the name of
popular sovereignty, democratic participation, and political deliberation. Now that is a frightening transformation.

7. Deborah J. Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New
Role for the GuaranteeClause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815,828 (1994).
8. 112 S. Ct. at 2431.
9. Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under The Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable,65 U. COLO.L. REV. 849, 868 (1994) (this issue).

